

The 'War on Terrorism': 12 month audit and future strategy options

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Executive Summary

This report examines the effectiveness of the 'war on terrorism' and outlines options open to western governments in dealing with the harsh challenges of political violence.

The attacks of 11 September showed with appalling clarity that the most powerful and most heavily armed state in the world was vulnerable, in a manner that left a deep and lasting shock. The US reaction has been a sustained attempt to regain control of its security by means of a wide-ranging and near-global military response. It has involved a war in Afghanistan, the extension of military power to new regions and an increase in the military budget that is greater than Britain's total defence budget. The immediate prospect is for further conflict in Afghanistan and a war with Iraq that could have devastating consequences for the region and possibly for the world. Moreover, US security policy now ignores most forms of multilateral co-operation while developing a military posture that includes pre-emption on its own terms.

This comes at a time when Britain, Sweden and other member states of the European Union are beginning to discover the effectiveness of non-violent methods of addressing the causes of conflict and political violence. In terms of the involvement of states and inter-state organisations, such methods are in their early stages of development, even if they are far better known to non-government organisations, and have been practised by citizen groups and others for very many years.

What is significant is that the methods of conflict prevention and resolution are just beginning to be recognised by a few governments as potential alternatives, at precisely the time when the global response of the 'war on terror' is caught in the traditional yet highly-dangerous approaches built essentially on the maintenance of military control.

Yet the amount of money allocated, nationally and internationally, to support and develop best practice in conflict resolution and related activities remains far too low, considerably less than one percent of military budgets. This need not be the case. The examples cited in this paper are just some of the many examples of an alternative approach to security that offers so much. One year after the 11 September attacks, the audit of the results of traditional military responses shows continuing tensions, the risk of further attacks and new dangers, especially in the Middle East. It is appropriate to promote other viable responses.

It is particularly important that leadership is forthcoming, not just from civil society, but from governments in Europe and elsewhere. We need to move away from the false notion of military control with all its inherent risks. We have an opportunity to choose instead a condition of international stability based upon peace and justice, and non-violent approaches to conflict prevention and resolution.

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Audit of the effectiveness of the current approach

The attacks of 11 September prompted a vigorous military response as part of an international 'war on terror' conducted principally by the United States but involving military forces from a number of western allies and the support of security and intelligence agencies from a wider range of countries. The principal military action involved the destruction of the Taliban regime and attacks on al-Qaida forces in Afghanistan by means of a sustained air assault over several months, the involvement of special forces within Afghanistan and, of crucial importance, the use of ground forces belonging to the Northern Alliance, previously the oppositional faction in the Afghan civil war.

Secondary aspects of the war have been support for anti-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations in a number of countries especially the Philippines, the development of significant US bases in a number of Central Asian countries, and continuing support for the Sharon government in Israel in its actions against Palestinian militants and the Palestinian population of the occupied territories. Within the United States, there has been the extensive development of the concept of homeland defence and a substantial increase in defence spending.

The Bush administration remains broadly popular among the domestic US population in relation to its conduct of the war, but faces substantial problems of domestic economic and business policy. The popularity does not fully extend to proposals for terminating Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, with some significant political opposition now developing. Nevertheless, the administration is clearly determined to pursue the war against al-Qaida and similar organisations, and there appears to be a fundamental commitment to action against the Iraqi regime.

While international sympathy remains for the US in the light of the 11 September attacks, there is widespread concern in Europe about the development of the war, the lack of support for peace-building in Afghanistan and, in particular, the probability of a major war against Iraq. The concern is strongest in France and Germany, but there appears to be substantial political and public opposition in Britain to an attack on Iraq.

The effects of the war

The Taliban regime was destroyed within three months, with some thousands of Taliban militia killed, as well as a civilian death toll of at least 1000 and possibly over 3000. A large number of Taliban prisoners were killed after capture by Northern Alliance forces, possibly over 1000.

Although the Taliban were removed from power, in most cases they withdrew rather than face the combination of US air power and re-armed Northern Alliance forces. Very few members of the Taliban leadership were captured and most of the Taliban appear to have melted away into their own communities within Afghanistan or in Pakistan.

Al-Qaida operations in Afghanistan were very heavily disrupted in Afghanistan, including the destruction of training camps and weapons depots, but very few al-Qaida militia were captured or killed and the leadership largely survives. Most of the bases had already been abandoned before they were attacked. Much of the al-Qaida network was already located in many countries across the world, with key leadership elements located in Pakistan.

Within Afghanistan, the deployment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of up to 5000 troops has aided stability in the capital city of Kabul, but does not operate outside of the city-region. An interim government headed by President Karzai has been established, and substantial aid has begun to flow into Kabul and some other parts of the country. Schools and universities are re-opening, limited economic activity is developing, and there has been a partial return of refugees. The situation in Kabul, in particular, has improved since the beginning of this year.

Apart from ISAF, there are over 10,000 combat and support troops operating principally in eastern Afghanistan. Most of these are American and they are engaged in continuing anti-guerrilla operations, principally against elements of the Taliban. While these are described as 'remnants' and the operation is termed 'mopping up', conflict is continuing, with weekly attacks on foreign forces. It is proving persistently difficult to identify guerrilla units and a number of instances of the killing of civilians has limited local support for the anti-guerrilla operations.

UN specialists and others have frequently spoken of the need for a more substantial ISAF force, numbering up to 30,000 and providing security in a number of major cities and along linking highways. There are extensive plans for developing and equipping a national Afghan army of up to 60,000 troops. It has, however, proved difficult to get an appropriate ethnic mix among the early recruits, with conspicuous under-representation of the Pashtun, the largest ethnic group in the country from which the Taliban drew much of its support.

Training the new army is turning out to be problematic, with a high level of desertions within weeks of training (over 25% in the initial units). It is expected to take at least two years to train even a basic army and there is, meanwhile, rampant warlordism in much of the country. Opium poppy production has increased in recent months, partly to finance individual warlords.

Even in Kabul, the stability of the government is being seriously called into question. The Defence Minister (General Fahim Khan) maintains a large private army which is not under government control; a Vice-President and a Cabinet Minister have been assassinated; a massive car bomb was recently intercepted en route to its target, believed to be either the Presidential Palace or the US Embassy; and the President's bodyguard has been replaced by US troops. There are serious doubts about the viability of the state and repeated calls for a much greater commitment to state-building.

Britain has one of the better records in terms of development aid and early support for ISAF. Its separate commitment of a large Royal Marines contingent in support of counter-guerrilla operations resulted in no substantial engagements, but this follows a pattern experienced by US troops. The United States shows very little commitment to peace-building in Afghanistan, and has even resisted the expansion of ISAF, being primarily concerned with counter-guerrilla warfare.

Overall, there are serious and widespread concerns over the future stability of Afghanistan, but little sustained international security assistance where it is most needed. UN staff point to the need for a much higher level of commitment, and there is a fear of the development of warlordism into more general internal conflict and possibly even civil war, especially away from Kabul.

The status of al-Qaida

The al-Qaida group is now more commonly and accurately seen as a network of relatively loose groups sharing a common outlook and stretching across the world, rather than a narrow

hierarchical organisation headed by Osama bin Laden as the key figure. Even after the defeat of the Taliban and the withdrawal of al-Qaida from Afghanistan, US intelligence sources believe that its capability for further action is largely intact.

Its principal aims remain the termination of the House of Saud and its replacement by an acceptable Islamist regime, along with the eviction of foreign troops from the Kingdom and the region, especially US troops. Al-Qaida's commitment to the Palestinian cause is peripheral, although recent treatment of the Palestinians has resulted in its linking its more established motives to much stronger opposition to the state of Israel.

The organisation and its affiliates have substantial support within Saudi Arabia, and this extends to financial support from many sources. There are serious concerns within the United States over domestic stability in the Kingdom, and an increasing perception that it is effectively a base for operations of organisations such as al-Qaida, with signs of support from some officials.

Al-Qaida and its affiliates remain active, with many instances of actual or attempted attacks in recent months. Actual attacks include: the bombing of a synagogue in Tunisia and the killing of a number of German tourists; an attack on a church in a diplomatic compound in Islamabad; the bombing of a bus killing French naval technicians in Karachi; and the attempted destruction of the US consulate in the same city. Known examples of failed actions include: an attempt to shoot down a US air force plane in Saudi Arabia; planned attacks on western naval ships in the western Mediterranean; and plans to develop radiological weapons in the United States. There are unconfirmed reports of attempts to attack US embassies in Paris and Rome. There have not, at the time of writing, been further major attacks on the scale of 11 September, but it is likely that al-Qaida retains this ability.

In summary, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan has been destroyed and the al-Qaida forces there have been dispersed, but Afghanistan remains deeply unstable, few leaders of the Taliban or al-Qaida have been killed or captured and the latter organisation remains active. Its dispersal across countries may make it more difficult to counteract.

Israel and Palestine

In parallel with the war, there has been a steadily deteriorating security environment in Israel and the occupied territories. The intifada has continued, and has extended to the frequent use of suicide bombings in Israel and attacks against settlers in the territories. Existing Israeli military control of the West Bank and Gaza has become much more rigorous, with widespread and extreme restrictions on movement, and frequent use of assassinations, detention and retributive punishment.

The occupied territories have been likened to a vast open prison, with an almost complete collapse of the economy, rampant unemployment and major problems of health and nutrition. The infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority has been largely destroyed and there are numerous political factions. Antagonism to Israel has increased.

The Sharon government sees the use of force as the primary means of controlling violence against the Israeli state, but this serves to further radicalise Palestinian opinion. In particular, the use of considerable force in response to suicide bombings appears largely counter-productive.

Nevertheless, the Sharon government retains powerful support in Washington where the activities of suicide bombers are considered to parallel the 11 September attacks. US military equipment is

widely used against Palestinian targets and this serves to increase the anti-American mood across the whole of the region.

Political violence and hypocrisy

US and western policy is directed against current paramilitary groups that are considered to be terrorists, and against 'rogue states'. A central problem with this approach is that western states have frequently supported paramilitaries in the past, as indeed did the Soviet Union during the Cold War. US policy in Latin America involved support for dictatorial regimes that employed death squads, and the United States supported anti-Soviet groups and individuals in Afghanistan, including Osama bin Laden himself. In Africa and Asia, the United States, a number of its allies and Warsaw Pact states all used paramilitaries as proxies, many engaged in the use of terror as a political tool.

A major strand of current US policy towards the 'axis of evil' is the stated intention to terminate the Iraqi regime; yet the United States sided with Iraq in its war against Iran. There was substantial naval support at the time of the 'tanker war', including US naval attacks on Iranian navy ships, which caused considerable loss of life. More relevant in the current context was the aid given to the Iraqi armed forces in their assaults on Iranian positions, even though the Iraqis were known to be using chemical weapons against the Iranians. The possible Iraqi possession of chemical and biological weapons is now cited as a major reason for a war against the regime.

It is important to observe that the development of a military-oriented policy towards Iraq began well before the attacks of 11 September. During the 2000 presidential election, George W. Bush pledged to increase pressure on Baghdad and on entering office the new Administration began to review US policy towards Iraq. Newly-appointed members of this administration included Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, all of whom had signed a letter to President Clinton in 1998 arguing that Saddam Hussein had to be overthrown.¹

By February 2001 two camps had emerged. One group, including representatives from the Pentagon, Congress and Vice President Dick Cheney's office, advocated an aggressive strategy to support and empower the Iraqi National Congress to launch military operations against the Hussein regime. The other group, involving representatives from the State Department, favoured a policy of improved 'smart' sanctions to target the Hussein regime more severely.²

Following Iraqi intransigence on the return of UN weapons inspectors and growing disillusionment with the effectiveness of the sanctions regime, policy debate in Washington began to focus on military options and the potential for 'regime change'.

Until the attacks on 11 September energy remained focussed on reforming the sanctions regime and securing the return of weapons inspectors. Following the attacks and the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom, talk of 'regime change' in Iraq was quickly set in the context of the 'war on terrorism', even though there is little connection between the two. Immediately after the attacks President Bush held meetings with his top advisors and debate included policy towards Iraq, in which some from the Pentagon were arguing that the 'war against terrorism' should include Saddam Hussein.³ Donald Rumsfeld insisted in October 2001, "there is no question but that Iraq is a state that has committed terrorist acts and has sponsored terrorist acts".⁴ In January 2002 Iraq was re-branded a member of the 'axis of evil', along with North Korea and Iran, by President Bush in his State of the Union address:

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.

Opposition to Saddam Hussein's regime within the national security and foreign policy establishment in Washington is not new, and proposals for a military operation to remove him have always enjoyed considerable support from hard-line conservative thinkers. Nonetheless, it is misleading to suggest that an attack on Iraq has anything to do with the 'war on terrorism'. The 'war' has provided a convenient umbrella for the pursuit of unrelated foreign policy goals.

More generally, the response to the 11 September attacks puts the greatest emphasis on military reactions; this is a development of the Cold War approach to international security. In the following sections we will pay particular attention to two major issues that are now developing: the possibility of a war with Iraq, and responding to the risk of the use of weapons of mass destruction by paramilitary groups. We will then go on to discuss non-military alternatives to preventing and controlling political violence, alternatives that show much promise but receive little attention.

Option 1: Targeting Iraq

Reasoning

Although the focus of the 'war' has been on attacking and destroying terrorist and paramilitary movements believed to threaten the United States, a parallel development has been the view that it is unacceptable to have the Saddam Hussein regime retaining power in Baghdad. Although the subject of public debate in the United States, the Bush administration appears strongly committed to terminating the regime, with military action possible at some time during the period from November 2002 to March 2003.

The stated reason for terminating the regime has, until recently, been the refusal of the regime to allow UN weapons inspectors to enter Iraq to pursue their inspections of chemical and biological weapons facilities. There have been no UN inspections since 1998 and the US authorities believe that Iraq is developing chemical and biological weapon (CBW) capabilities. Nevertheless the dossier promised by the British government providing evidence of Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear programme has not been produced.

It is clear, though, that there are further reasons, given that senior administration officials have confirmed that a solution to this impasse is not enough, and that the regime must be replaced, by force if need be. It is not acceptable to those who hold this view for a 'rogue' state to be able to develop weapons of mass destruction. Such weapons may deter the United States in its ability to pursue its own security policies in the region. In contrast, the termination of the regime will, it is believed, send a powerful message to other regimes that the United States is prepared to take strong military action in pursuit of its interests. This should therefore deter other regimes from developing weapons of mass destruction and will thus be a powerful inducement for the control of proliferation.

There is an additional reason for replacing Saddam Hussein with a client regime supportive of the United States. Iraq is second only to Saudi Arabia in the size of its oil reserves, and a friendly regime in Baghdad would greatly decrease the significance of a potentially unstable Saudi Arabia as a source of oil. Furthermore, forceful action against Iraq will, it is believed, demonstrate the commitment of the United States to opposing radical regimes and movements in the region, undercutting support for Palestinian militants and making a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation more possible.

Method

In order to destroy the Iraqi regime, a strategy is being developed that would involve three main elements. At its core would be a series of sustained air attacks on all of the main facilities that enable the regime to maintain its own security, including air defences, air force and army bases, command, control and communications facilities, weapons plants and administrative centres.

The air war would extend to general transport and communications facilities, fuel storage depots, refining capabilities and electricity generation. This would follow the pattern developed in the Gulf War and also used against Serbia and, to an extent, in Afghanistan. Weapons used would include not only precision-guided conventional munitions but also specialised weapons intended specifically to destroy electricity supply networks and high-power microwave weapons for destroying computers and other electronic equipment.

The second element would be troop movements to control the oil-producing region around Basra and to acquire and maintain control of the Kurdish areas in the North, including air fields and oil-production facilities. The regime in Baghdad would thus be militarily and economically crippled and its energy supplies severely disrupted.

The final element would be the use of troops to move towards Baghdad, primarily to force the regime to commit its elite Republican Guard units in support of the defence of the capital city, exposing them to the full force of US air attacks using area-impact munitions such as cluster bombs and fuel-air explosives. It is anticipated that this military campaign would most likely commence during the winter months and would be completed by March, with the regime replaced by an acceptable leadership.

Consequences

Saddam Hussein's regime would, in turn, be likely to respond in a number of ways. Apart from diplomatic prevarication and a sustained policy of building support in the region, it would seek to further enhance its present policy of dispersal of all its key military assets, with an emphasis on distributing them throughout Baghdad and other urban areas. This would be done in order to maximise the difficulties facing US troops in trying to establish control of the capital.

Based on what is known of its planning during the Gulf War, the regime would be prepared to use chemical and biological weapons if faced with its termination, given that regime survival is its fundamental concern. This might extend to the use of CBW against targets in Kuwait and possibly Israel, together with the use of paramilitaries to attack and disrupt Gulf oil production facilities. Sabotage of Iraq's own oil production facilities is likely. Attacks on neighbouring states with chemical or biological weapons causing substantial casualties should be expected to lead to a nuclear response from the United States or Israel.

In any case, given that US military action would be designed to minimise casualties to its own troops, and that Iraq would seek to maximise such casualties, the United States would make very heavy use of air power, and it is extremely difficult to see how heavy civilian casualties could be avoided, even without the use of weapons of mass destruction.

Moreover, the destruction of the power and transport infrastructure would be severely damaging to the ordinary people of Iraq, not least in terms of drinking water supplies, sewage treatment, food distribution and health services. Long term socio-economic effects would be considerable.

If a war against the Saddam Hussein regime did lead to its destruction, the very act of war, and the replacement of the regime with one acceptable to the United States, would be seen as proof of the determination of the US to exert control in the region. As such, it would be exactly what al-Qaida and associated groups have been arguing for more than a decade: that the United States is engaged in direct regional control. The effect would be to increase opposition to the US presence, adding significantly to the base of support for such groups.

Moreover, it is unlikely that making an example of the Iraqi regime would discourage other states from exercising policies that were not acceptable to Washington. Instead, states that saw themselves as insecure in the face of US security policy would seek asymmetric ways of ensuring their security, including secretive development of deterrent capabilities and the use of surrogates and paramilitaries rather than conventional forces that would be susceptible to attack.

In short, a war against Iraq carries formidable dangers, is likely to result in substantial civilian casualties and could lead to the use of weapons of mass destruction. Even if successful in US terms, its longer term impact should be expected to be to increase antagonism to the United States in the region.

Option 2: Addressing the Iraq situation without military attack

It is difficult to see any effective and safe solution to the problems between Iraq and the United States, but such a solution is desperately needed, not least because of the massive dangers and likely disastrous after-effects of a war against Iraq. What is clear is that any alternative approach to military action would include the following three elements. First, there would have to be a much more substantial programme of UN food and development aid to ordinary Iraqis, a development of the food-for-oil approach that has existed in a limited form for some years, but has had, at best, variable results so far. A greatly improved system could be devised, extending beyond food aid to a range of carefully targeted development assistance programmes, focused particularly on health and education. It could, in particular, substantially ease the malnutrition and health problems that have had such a serious effect, especially on children.

Secondly, economic sanctions could be targeted more specifically upon the elite, including regional co-operation to limit the smuggling of oil that has served the regime so well. Thirdly, better relations with several key neighbours of Iraq would be essential to any sustainable solution within the region, and to achieving the second objective. Such diplomatic moves would require a sustained commitment to a fair and just settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian confrontation.

It is unfortunate, to say the least, that US policies currently militate so strongly against these aspects. Its continuing and substantial support for the hard-line actions of the Sharon government make relations with key Arab states tense. To make matters worse, two countries with substantial common borders with Iraq, namely Iran and Syria, are currently considered by the United States to be greater or lesser members of the 'axis of evil'.

Although a much improved aid and sanctions approach has been advocated by many people, including former UN diplomats with significant experience in Iraq, it has proved unacceptable to successive US administrations. We are therefore left with a repressive regime that appears to be firmly in control, but with the great majority of Iraqis experiencing persistent hardship. The regime is now considered a threat and must therefore, in the US view, be terminated.

Given the considerable risks of war in terms of regional stability, let alone the probability of considerable civilian casualties during the war and a humanitarian disaster afterwards, policy makers have a duty to investigate other options. Alternatives are less easy to develop now than they were five or ten years ago because opportunities have been squandered. Previous attempts at containment have had little effect on the regime itself, but have harmed ordinary Iraqis. On the other hand, a combination of a determined effort to seek a just settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, coupled with more narrowly-targeted sanctions would make it possible to severely limit the capabilities of the regime.

It is not just the military option that is dangerous. The current policy of generalised sanctions is entirely unacceptable. If we seek an alternative to a devastating war with Iraq, the entire approach

to sanctions will have to be re-thought. What is clear is that the system of sanctions imposed on Iraq since 1991 has been an abject failure and has caused considerable suffering to ordinary Iraqis.

This is not in any sense a matter of propaganda, but is the considered view of highly-experienced aid agencies that have a long history of providing humanitarian relief in Iraq itself. Much of this has been through Caritas Europa, including its UK partner, the Catholic Fund for Overseas Development (CAFOD). A Caritas Europa delegation to Iraq in January 2001, which included CAFOD representatives, concluded that:

Comprehensive sanctions imposed on Iraq, now in their eleventh year, have resulted in untold suffering for millions of people - physical, mental and cultural. No one knows how many have died as a result of sanctions but it is believed to include thousands of children a month. The effects of sanctions - even were they to be lifted today - will certainly be felt for many years to come. It is indelibly printed on the Iraqi psyche. A once prosperous nation, home to the world's second largest oil reserves - is being systematically de-developed, de-skilled and reduced to penury.⁵

In answer to this, some western governments point to the responsibility for this on-going disaster being that of the regime itself, and that the regime could chose to take the action that would allow the lifting of sanctions or could at least ameliorate the current disastrous situation where an Iraqi elite of perhaps one million people thrives at the expense of the other 20 million.

While it is true that the regime could take such action, the whole point is that it does not do so, and the sanctions process that has been in force for eleven years has been unable to force it to do so. We are therefore in the situation where supporters of the current sanctions regime continue with it even while we know its effects on the majority of the population. It is for this reason, along with the much greater humanitarian concerns, that the entire sanctions process must be re-directed in a manner which increasingly by-passes the elite's ability to maintain its privileged status at the expense of the majority. This can only be done as part of a wider regional approach that includes improved relations with neighbouring countries in the context of rapid progress to resolve the Israeli/Palestinian confrontation.

Policy on Iraq inevitably raises the issue of weapons of mass destruction, and recent claims that Iraq is close to having a nuclear weapons capability. While Iraq may have the expertise to develop nuclear weapons, its technical capability to do so was comprehensively destroyed by international inspectors after the 1991 war, and the very limited stocks of enriched uranium, possibly sufficient for one crude device, were removed.

If Iraq is really close to having nuclear weapons, as the US government now says, and given that it is clear that it does not have the internal capacity to produce weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium, then the US view implies that the regime must have an overseas source for such fissile materials. For even a very limited nuclear capacity of six fission bombs, it would require approximately 50 kg of weapons-grade plutonium or about 120 kg of highly enriched uranium.

The implication behind the view from Washington is that such sources of fissile material are currently available from other states or non-state actors. If available to Iraq, then they would be available to other states in the 'axis of evil' such as North Korea, Syria, Iran and Libya. If this is the case, and there is no independent evidence in support of it, then the absolute priority for the

United States should be to close the source or sources of potential supply, wherever they may be, rather than declaring war on one possible recipient.

In relation to Iraq, this further demonstrates the importance of restoring the UN inspection system, a view that appears to be increasingly prominent in UK government circles,⁶ in contrast to the US view that inspection is irrelevant and the regime must be terminated. The view gaining ground in the United Kingdom is much more widely held among other European governments and forms part of a more general commitment to multilateral approaches to arms control and disarmament. They include emphasis on the chemical and biological conventions, negotiated control of proliferation and processes to control fissile material.

The current US administration has moved powerfully away from this approach to a more unilateralist stance in which counter-proliferation activities must, if thought necessary, involve military pre-emption. Iraq represents the test case for such a policy, and the consequences could be disastrous. There should be no pretence that there is an easy alternative to war, but it is desperately important that such an alternative, along the lines suggested here, is investigated and developed.

Current US policy does not allow for the development of such an approach, and it is in this regard that European opinion and support could be more influential. It is far from a perfect option, but it is much less dangerous than the risks involved in a full scale war in the Middle East.
Robust action on terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction

Option 3: Robust action on terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction

Although most paramilitary and terrorist groups do not seek to cause mass casualties, some do and have been highly significant in recent years. They include the LTTE in Sri Lanka, Aum Shinri Kyo in Japan, white supremacists in the United States, Islamic and Hindu fundamentalists in South Asia and al-Qaida. At the same time, most forms of mass-casualty terrorism in recent years have been conducted by governments against their own people, not least the widespread use of death squads in Latin America, genocidal attacks in eastern Africa, and massacres in Indonesia, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere. Even so, the 11 September attacks, in particular, show that some groups will aim to cause mass casualties in future attacks by targeting as many people as possible and causing the maximum amount of social and economic disruption. Perhaps the most effective way of achieving this objective is to use a weapon of mass destruction. There is, therefore, clearly a danger, some would say an inevitability, that future paramilitary organisations will develop, fabricate and use weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological or nuclear.⁷

Use of chemical weapons

Of the three types of weapons of mass destruction, chemical ones are the most accessible to paramilitaries, as the Aum group demonstrated. Methods of preparing chemical-warfare agents are described in the open literature and it is relatively easy to obtain the chemicals required to do so, and then to prepare the agent. The lethality of chemical weapons was brought home when, for

example, Iraq used them against its Kurdish civilians at Halabja in March 1988. About 4000 Kurds died and 7000 were injured in this atrocity.

There are five main categories of chemical-warfare agents: incapacitating; choking; blister; blood; and nerve agents. Those most likely to be used are nerve agents, such as sarin. Nerve agents attack the nervous system and within minutes of a significant exposure, increasingly severe symptoms appear. At high doses, coughing and breathing problems begin to happen, followed by convulsions, deep coma and finally death. A minute drop of a nerve gas, inhaled or absorbed through the skin or eyes, is enough to kill. If appropriate dispersal systems were available, paramilitary groups would only need to produce a small quantity of a nerve agent to kill a large number of people.

Despite the entry into force of the 1996 Chemical Weapons Convention that bans the production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons, this has not yet been ratified by all states and it would, in any case, be very difficult to prevent groups from getting hold of the chemicals needed to produce such a quantity of nerve gas.

Use of biological weapons

Biological warfare agents are pathogenic organisms, including bacteria, viruses, rickettsiae and fungi, and toxins produced by them. Diseases caused by bacteria include anthrax, cholera, pneumonic plague and typhoid. Viruses cause, for example, AIDS, flu, polio and smallpox. Rickettsias are bacteria that can only live inside cells that behave as host cells. Carried by lice, ticks and fleas, they cause diseases like typhus, Q-fever and Rocky Mountain spotted fever. Some fungi produce toxins that are particularly lethal.

There have been a number of incidents in which terrorists have been found in possession of biological agents. For example, in 1972 members of the Order of the Rising Sun were arrested in Chicago with about 35 kilograms of typhoid bacteria cultures. The right-wing group intended to poison water supplies in Chicago, St. Louis and other cities. In the 1980s, a house used by the Red Army Faction in Paris was found to contain a large amount of botulinum toxin.⁸ The Aum group made unsuccessful attempts to disseminate botulinum toxin (in Tokyo in April 1990 and June 1993) and anthrax in Tokyo.⁹ Anthrax is likely to be the biological agent preferred by paramilitaries because: it is very lethal (inhalation of anthrax is almost always fatal); it is relatively easily produced in large quantities at low cost; knowledge about anthrax and its production is widely available in the open literature; it is very stable and can be stored for a very long period as a dry powder; and it is relatively easy to disperse as an aerosol with crude sprayers.

Terrorists could acquire biological agents from civilian or medical research laboratories, from someone working in the laboratory or by theft. Alternatively, they could buy them from legitimate suppliers, although with difficulty. Biological agents can also be acquired from materials taken from nature. Examples are the bacterium *Clostridium botulinum*, and bacteria causing anthrax and brucellosis. Ease of acquisition is one reason why sub-state groups are likely to find biological agents attractive. They are also cheap. The cost of killing a person with a biological weapon is a very small fraction of doing so with a nuclear or chemical weapon or even a conventional weapon. They are relatively easily dispersed, although an effective attack would require a large volume of a virulent strain.

In 1972 the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention was established requiring states not to develop, produce, stockpile or acquire biological agents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective, and other peaceful uses” as well as weapons and

means of delivery. It does not, however, prohibit research or contain provisions to verify compliance. At the 1996 review of the treaty an Ad Hoc Group was established to draft a legally binding protocol to strengthen the verification provisions of the treaty and prevent further proliferation of biological weapons materials. Discussions continued for several years until it seemed an effective verification protocol would finally be reached. However, in December 2001 the talks collapsed as the United States controversially rejected the proposals at the last minute.

Use of nuclear weapons

After the recent terrorist attacks in New York and Washington in September 2001 and the use of chemical weapons by the Aum group in Tokyo, the next rung on the ladder of escalation may well be the acquisition and use of a nuclear weapon. Many believe that the most likely way in which a terrorist group would acquire a nuclear explosive is by stealing a nuclear weapon from a military stockpile or by stealing one while it was being transported. The break up of the former Soviet Union, and the economic and social chaos that followed, encouraged this view. But it is not only the ex-Soviet nuclear arsenal that we should worry about. As the global quantities of plutonium and highly-enriched uranium rise, it is increasingly possible for a terrorist group to illegally acquire the fissile materials that they could use to fabricate a nuclear explosive device (whether from civil or military origins).

Since 1945, the world has produced around 1500 tonnes of plutonium. About 250 tonnes of this is weapon-grade, for use in nuclear weapons. The other 1250 tonnes is civilian plutonium, produced as waste from power-generating reactors. By 2020 the civil plutonium stockpile is likely to increase to 3000 tonnes. About 300 tonnes of civil plutonium has been separated from spent reactor fuel elements in reprocessing plants; if current reprocessing plans go ahead, by the year 2010 there will be about 550 tonnes of separated civil plutonium.¹⁰ Such plutonium consists almost entirely of 'reactor-grade' plutonium that can be used in nuclear weapons, although it is not ideal for the purpose. It is widely distributed across the industrial nations with nuclear power programmes.

The situation with highly enriched uranium (HEU) is different from that with plutonium. The bulk of the world's stock of HEU is military and used in nuclear weapons; only about one percent is civil, mainly used to fuel civilian research reactors. Moreover, the HEU removed from dismantled weapons can be disposed of more easily by mixing it with natural or depleted uranium to produce low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel. Low-enriched uranium is not usable as a nuclear explosive. There are about 1900 tonnes of HEU in the world, mainly owned by the United States and Russia. About 1500 tonnes of HEU are outside nuclear weapons and about 410 tonnes in active nuclear weapons. It is estimated that the dismantling of nuclear weapons will produce about 30 tonnes of HEU a year in each of the United States and Russia.

Around 60 percent of civilian plutonium and HEU is under the full international safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but this includes the non-nuclear weapon states that have signed the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) along with Britain and France. The remaining 40 percent is held in the United States and Russia. India, Pakistan and Israel also have significant stocks of fissile material outside IAEA inspections that are part of their nuclear weapon programmes. Only a tiny proportion of military plutonium and HEU is currently under international safeguards.

If a group were to acquire sufficient 'reactor-grade' plutonium it could manufacture a crude nuclear device. Even if the device, when detonated, did not produce a significant nuclear explosion, the explosion of the chemical high explosives would disperse the plutonium widely. If

an incendiary material were mixed with the high explosives the explosion would be accompanied by a fierce fire causing a high proportion of the plutonium to be dispersed or volatilised by the fierce heat. The dispersal of plutonium would make a large part of a city uninhabitable until decontaminated, a procedure which could take years.

Large paramilitary groups are often closely linked with organised crime and the smuggling of nuclear materials. A kilogram of weapon-grade plutonium, for example, would probably be worth one or two million dollars on the black-market. It would be about the size of a golf ball, small enough to be smuggled easily across borders. Both weapon-usable plutonium and HEU are weakly radioactive and difficult to detect using radiation detectors.

Fissile materials in Russia are kept in more than 100 institutions and facilities. Fears that a flourishing black-market exists, involving the smuggling of fissile materials from Russia and other ex-Soviet republics, have been reinforced by a number of recent incidents. For example, in December 1994, the Czech authorities seized three kilograms of HEU. There are reports that security police confiscated nearly 40 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium in December 1993 in Odessa in the Ukraine, and, during 1994, more than 400 grams of weapons-grade plutonium were seized in Germany. These smuggling incidents, which are almost certainly the tip of an iceberg, suggest that a significant black market in fissile materials exists. Given the many possible routes to smuggle materials from the former Soviet Union, it is impossible to know the extent of the activity.

What needs to be done

To prevent terrorists acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction the international community must develop and commit to global and regional comprehensive non-proliferation strategies involving four components.¹¹

1. **Strengthening non-proliferation norms.**
Current international agreements, conventions and treaties relating to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons should be strengthened and enforced. In particular, an effective protocol to verify the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention must be agreed and implemented, and a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) to ban any further production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons must be negotiated. Unfortunately both of these efforts have repeatedly failed over the past five years when agreement could have been reached. Means of introducing legally-enforceable sanctions if violations occur must also be investigated in full.
2. **Improving safeguards.**
Efforts to safeguard and eliminate fissile materials that can be used to fabricate nuclear explosives must be stepped up. This means: improving physical protection measures at key sites; improving accountancy procedures for these lethal materials; placing all civilian fissile materials and excess military stocks of fissile materials under full international safeguards; converting all HEU to low-enriched uranium; and developing politically acceptable and technically viable means for the permanent disposition of plutonium.
3. **Strengthening export controls.**
Export controls remain weak in China and Russia, and can be circumvented in Europe. Mechanisms to standardise and legally enforce these export controls must be

implemented, although the problem of 'dual use' goods will continue to plague such efforts.

4. Effective intelligence.

The importance of effective strategic intelligence in countering WMD terrorism cannot be over-estimated. Experience shows, however, that setting up effective intelligence activities against terrorist groups is extremely challenging. Rivalries between intelligence agencies within countries and lack of cooperation in intelligence matters between countries seriously reduce effectiveness. The intelligence and security agencies, in their fight against terrorism, face an awesome task that will require new technologies, a close study of new terrorist threats and, perhaps most importantly, an imaginative approach. In the age of the Internet, knowledge is available to all. This, and the revolution in communications, have had a considerable impact on society and have removed one of the few advantages of the intelligence community. In future, success in countering terrorism will depend on the effective application of ingenuity and innovation.

Finally, the acknowledged and de facto nuclear weapon states should make every effort to devalue the role of nuclear weapons in international relations by abstaining from the development of any new nuclear weapons and signing and ratifying the nuclear Comprehensive Test Ban treaty (CTBT). In particular Russia and the United States must take steps to ensure the permanent and verifiable removal of excess nuclear warheads from their respective stockpiles under nuclear arms control treaties, rather than storing them as a hedge for the future. India and Pakistan must work to ensure that the repetitive cycle of nuclear brinkmanship is broken through a sustained programme of effective confidence building measures. If the nuclear taboo is strengthened, rather than weakened, and the role of nuclear weapons downgraded, rather than enhanced, efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism will be more credible and effective.

Option 4: Breaking the cycle of violence

Since the attacks of 11 September, the main response, especially from the United States, has been military, with persistent action in Afghanistan, the extension of military bases into Central Asia, support for counter-insurgency activities in numerous countries, and now the prospect of a war with Iraq. Yet there has also been the continuation and enhancement of quite different approaches to problems of political violence and conflict, approaches that seek to prevent conflict while understanding some of its root causes.

In particular, there is a greater concern with the dangers of what may be called the cycle of violence, and where to intervene to break this cycle. This is not to say that the cycle of violence is the only cause of terrorism, nor is terrorism its only result. Nevertheless it helps to explain why the use of terror as a weapon recurs throughout history, and offers pointers as to how the deeper human reasons for resorting to terror can effectively be addressed.

The cycle of violence


The classic cycle of violence, which ensures that conflict follows conflict, has roughly seven stages. This cycle has been evident in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in central Africa and repeatedly in different regions of former Yugoslavia.

This is how the cycle of violence works in the human psyche, and it is at a human level that option four operates, because the origins of the cycle can only be dismantled within the individual human mind and heart.



Breaking the cycle

Intervention is needed at the point before anger hardens into bitterness, revenge and retaliation. To be effective it must address the physical, the political and the psychological security of people trapped in violence; all are equally important, and one without the other is insufficiently strong to break the cycle. In every case, the people involved in situations of violence must be supported in the development of their own resources for transformation. We will now illustrate what is meant by interventions for physical, political and psychological security, giving four examples in each case. (This report is concerned with conflict resolution or mitigation initiatives per se, and does not attempt to include reference to the profoundly important role of relief, development and human-rights agencies.)



Intervention for physical security

Peace keeping: Where people have murdered, brutalised or tortured each other, the first necessity is to keep them physically separated. Strategies for peacekeeping are developing through the harsh experience of the tragedies of Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Somalia, Cambodia and Cyprus. The consequences of late intervention, inadequate intervention, or no intervention at all (as in the case of Tibet, Burma, Iraq, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, Sri Lanka or Kashmir) are becoming clear. There is now an extensive body of knowledge and training on this subject, developed by the United Nations, independent research institutes and many national armed forces.¹²

Many peacekeeping operations have been hindered by problems preventing them from achieving the desired results. These problems include the operational mandates (Bosnia), timely availability of sufficient resources and competent personnel, and permission from the relevant heads of state to operate in-country (East Timor). However, as stated innumerable times by Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations, the principal obstacle to effective UN peacekeeping is the level of political will among the members of UN Security Council, especially the permanent five (P5). But, where peacekeeping operations have sufficient support, they prevent bloodshed and perform the essential task of creating an environment in which peace building and reconciliation can take place.

*...if we are given the means - in Kosovo and Sierra Leone, in East Timor and Angola - we have a real opportunity to break the cycle of violence once and for all.*¹³

Protection: When civilians are threatened, driven from their homes, or under attack from militias, they can effectively be protected in a number of ways. One is by the introduction of trained civilian violence monitors, as in the case of Kosovo by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a regional intergovernmental organisation with 55 member nations. For the six months prior to the NATO decision to bomb Serbia, the OSCE had deployed 1300 monitors throughout Kosovo. The monitors were from all over Europe, their job to check and report on instances of intimidation or ethnic violence.

*The mission, staffed by more than 30 nations, is being loaded with ...tasks: maintenance of the cease-fire, separation of the military forces, mediation of disputes, protection of human rights, collection of war crimes evidence, building up of democratic institutions and holding municipal elections.*¹⁴

There is good evidence to show that everywhere the orange landrovers of the OSCE went, violence stopped. It was precisely at the point when these monitors were withdrawn and the bombing began that the wave of killing and eviction began in earnest.

Another form of protection is provided by NGO initiatives like the Peace Brigades International (PBI) who mobilise and provide trained units of volunteers, in areas of high tension, to help discourage violent outbreaks. This kind of intervention only works when the aggressor knows that enough of the international community supports the protectors. For example, in Columbia in 1995, where there had been 38,000 political assassinations over a four year period, PBI sent teams to provide round-the-clock unarmed protection for prominent human rights activists whose colleagues had been killed, abducted or tortured. One such activist said:

*The death sentence against each and every one of us has not been carried out only because we have had Peace Brigades International accompaniment.*¹⁵

This work has shrunk the ‘impunity space’, the space available for repressive regimes for violent and illegal action. American citizens undertook similar work in Nicaragua in the 1980s with an organisation that became known as Witness for Peace. In addition to living in villages at risk of violence from the Contras, Witness delegations, enjoying the relative protection that their nationality offered them, soon began following the Contras with notepads and cameras to record everything they saw. In some places their work took the form of taking testimonies from those who had been brutalised by the Contras. The same organisation provided video cameras to non-violent autonomous activists in northeast India to prevent abduction and murder by security forces. Peter Gabriel, co-founder of Witness says:

*A camera in the right hands at the right time at the right place can be more powerful than tanks and guns. Let the truth do the fighting.*¹⁶

Arms export controls: Embargoes or sanctions against the supply of arms to areas of conflict rarely work, for a number of reasons. These could effectively be addressed if:

- A. supplier countries agree and police a binding code not to supply to areas where conflict is imminent, and impose penalties for supposed end users who re-sell arms;
- B. substantial funds are provided, possibly through a tax on corporate suppliers, to introduce effective boundary controls on gun-running, and severe and enforceable penalties;
- C. the permanent five members of the Security Council cut their arms exports. Over the last five years, the United States has sold \$50bn worth of major conventional arms, Russia has sold \$16bn, China \$1.5bn, the United Kingdom \$7bn, and France \$11bn.¹⁷

As in the case of nuclear weapons, the P5’s refusal to exercise restraint has led to other countries following their example. Germany and the Netherlands now have energetic arms exports, encouraging the excuse, when a large sale is pending, “if we don’t supply them, someone else will”. That argument was used to justify slave trading. An international treaty to control and reduce arms sales is essential if terrorism, by state or non-state parties, is to be dealt with. NGOs such as Saferworld and Oxfam have helped secure a European Code of Conduct limiting arms exports.

The second rationale put forward for justifying arms exports is the necessity to protect jobs in the defence industry. This argument, repeated so often that it has assumed the status of a national myth, has comprehensively been shown to be false. In a report published in July 2001, and unchallenged since, research showed that each job in UK defence exports costs the British taxpayer £4600 per annum, and that instead of contributing to the economy, or even to the effectiveness of HM forces, arms exports are a net drain on the British economy, and the favouring of British suppliers has led to inferior equipment.¹⁸ The same subsidies, applied to new products in the fast-growing environmental sector, would be more productive and better support the wider British economy.

Gun collection: When a country is awash with weapons after a civil war, effective schemes are needed to collect and destroy the weapons. This has been undertaken in recent years by the United Nations in Albania, by NATO in Macedonia, and by individual initiatives in other countries. For example, in El Salvador in 1995 a group of businessmen whose trucks were being hijacked by heavily armed gangs (as a result of twelve years of civil war) copied a successful initiative from the Dominican Republic. For every gun surrendered they offered food vouchers worth \$100. By the end of the second weekend vouchers worth \$103,000 had been issued, despite

the organisation having only \$19,500 available funds. In view of the success of the programme the President of El Salvador intervened to help, and in three years over 10,000 weapons were handed in.

Intervention for political security

Law enforcement is a pre-requisite of stabilisation, whether before, during or after major conflict. It is now widely recognised that strategies for security sector reform must take an integrated approach. The UK government's approach to the security problems in Sierra Leone show that an integrated strategy can be very effective. In this case, four government departments, Department for International Development (DfID), Ministry of Defence (MoD), the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) addressed different aspects security sector reform:

- DfID funded activities in support of civilian control of the security sector;
- MoD helped to develop a national security policy, including the reorganisation of Sierra Leone's defence ministry, and training the army;
- the Home Office provided personnel skilled in managing reform of police services; and
- the FCO helped to fund military education and training.¹⁹

Unless the legal and coercive instruments which a citizen encounters are perceived as legitimate and independent, then the capacity of the state to implement policies intended to support reconciliation and prosecute human rights violations will be severely undermined. For example, during South Africa's transition to fully democratic post-apartheid politics, a lack of faith in the criminal justice system was a significant obstacle to progressing towards the new political regime.

...it was widely perceived that apartheid crimes could not be handed over to the old criminal justice system. The whole edifice of a culture of human rights and equal citizenship rests upon the existence of a 'state of right', which involves an end to the arbitrariness and irrationality of a repressive juridical apparatus and the establishment of due process and fairness.²⁰

Free elections: The removal of a dictator and installation of democratic process is a monumental task. This was certainly so in the case of Slobodan Milosevic, named by the International Crisis Group as the "single greatest cause of instability and conflict in south eastern Europe". In July 1999 the US-based East-West Institute and the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs brought together the representatives of pro-democracy forces from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including trade unions, NGOs and independent media. A task force was set up to assist all those working for change, who had been active, even against terrible odds during the war. They built a coalition eventually known as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, which was able to build a common strategy united behind one candidate, Vojislav Kostunica. With extensive election monitoring and a wave of non-violent protest when Milosevic attempted to annul election results, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia won the Serbian elections.

The extent to which a population values the opportunity a free election provides to express the popular will, especially when the population has previously been denied democratic rights to political participation, can be clearly demonstrated. For example, in 1999 the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) undertook voter education and registration for the referendum in which the East Timorese would decide between independence from Indonesia or a form of autonomy. Despite the increase in violence by militias against the civilian population prior to the election, an astonishing 98% of the electorate voted.

Enthusiasm, even joy, was widespread, as it always seems to be when people are given the first chance to vote in their lives.²¹

The fact that the election results preceeded an increase in violence, illustrated in a terrible way just how significant the free election was. Such an incontrovertible public assertion of the will of the people could not be ignored by those so bitterly opposed to this process.

Control of militias: Armed militias or paramilitaries have to be brought to the negotiating table. This is not necessarily best done by armed forces; in many instances NGOs or respected civilians have succeeded. For example, in Mozambique the Community of Saint' Egidio, supported by the Vatican, became involved in a series of meetings with leaders of FRELIMO and RENAMO, culminating in October 1992 in the signing of a comprehensive peace accord. This provided for the demobilisation and re-integration of combatants, the creation of a new Mozambican Defence Force, the creation of political parties and freedom of the press. The United Nations was given the responsibility of overseeing the transition from war to peace which led to the first free elections in October 1994.

Free press: An independent media is essential to the prevention of war. Conversely hate radio can inflame conflict to white heat, as happened in the Rwandan genocide. In nearby Burundi in 1994 violence began to spiral; the main radio station was controlled by the state, whose army had been complicit in the violence. With the aid of the US-based NGO, Search for Common Ground, the independent 'Studio Ijambo' was launched early in 1995. In spite of one of the team members being killed by the army, they continued their balanced news coverage, proposing solutions to the crisis facing the country. In two years they produced 2500 features on peaceful co-existence and a soap opera to which after four years 85% of the entire population was listening. Studio Ijambo has received many international awards for its role in calming explosive tensions, defusing rumours, and promoting reconciliation.

During the operation of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), it soon became clear that the only way UNTAC was going to be able to communicate their message in the face of systematic intimidation by Khmer Rouge and others, particularly to communities in the rural areas, was by radio.

The broadcasts of Radio UNTAC helped offset the political impact of the violence of the regime and the threats of the Khmer Rouge. It became one of the most successful components of the UN's operation in Cambodia. For the first time Cambodians had a free and unbiased source of information, and nearly the entire population became avid listeners.²²

Intervention for psychological security

Witness: The traumas experienced by victims of atrocity need attention and, if possible, healing. One way in which this is done simply and effectively is by a technique called 'active listening', whereby an independent witness or witnesses gives the traumatised person their full attention for as long as necessary to discharge their fear, grief and anger. This simple technique takes time and care, but done well it prevents anger hardening into bitterness and retaliation. In Croatia, for example, in the midst of the war, a group of citizens set up the 'Centre for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights' in Osijek. Today it has grown into one of the largest citizen-led peace-building organisations in the country. The centre sends 'peace teams' to towns and villages to aid the healing of trauma which has left so many people emotionally scarred. In places where Serbs

still live, the peace teams have made important progress in reducing the level of animosity and tension between Serbs and Croats, thus reducing the probability of violence breaking out anew.

In every conflict, there are those willing to risk their lives to build a non-violent solution. Such people are often community or church leaders, and frequently women. There are a multitude of examples, including: the initiative of Liberian women to bring about disarmament before elections from 1993-7; the Women's Organisation of Somalia who emerged in the midst of war to prepare the groundwork for peace; the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, mothers of the disappeared in Argentina who helped transform a fractured and violent society; and the Women of Wajir in north eastern Kenya. Their motto was:

You must commit yourself to continuing the peace work no matter what happens: if my clan were to kill your relatives, would you still work with me for peace? If you can't say yes, don't join our group.

Their intervention was key to ending an inter-clan war by setting up public meetings and rapid response teams. It was so successful and cost effective that it has now been copied in other parts of the country, co-ordinated by a special representative in the office of the Kenyan President.

Bridge building: The efficacy of bridge-building between communities fractured by decades of violence has been most evident recently in N. Ireland, where it has long been recognised that support for community bridge-building is an essential element of efforts designed to overcome deeply ingrained community hatred and suspicion, with particular attention being paid to school children in N. Ireland. For example, during the late 1980s and early 1990s Education for Mutual Understanding, an educational working group, was established which sought to enable children to: learn to respect and value themselves and others; appreciate the interdependence of people within society; know about and understand what is shared as well as what is different about their cultural traditions; and appreciate the benefits of resolving conflict by non-violent means.²³ They aim, through education and inter-school programmes, to assist children's understanding of their cultural heritage and common experience. The project originally operated only in one district of N. Ireland; the organisers worked out that to extend the project across the province, it would cost £1.39m, or 0.25% of the annual education budget.

In India there are many potent examples of bridge-building. In the slums of Ahmedabad, a small NGO called St. Xavier's Social Service Society has worked for years in fostering a climate of inter-religious understanding between the desperately poor Muslim and Hindu communities. By targeting false rumours before they spread, by setting up 'peace committees' made up of local people and by proactively addressing the root causes of the tensions between Hindus and Muslims in the slums, St. Xavier has undoubtedly made a significant contribution to inter-religious co-existence in the area.

The lies, suspicion and betrayals which characterise war can fester for decades and erupt in further atrocity if not addressed. This needs to be done in public and in a safe and controlled environment, and one of the most effective is a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. To date there have been twenty of these, each building on the lessons of the last, the most well known being held in South Africa from 1995 to 1998.²⁴ The process, when properly conducted, goes far deeper than any superficial bargaining for amnesty. The South African constitution of 1993 talks of the importance of reconciliation and reconstruction:


[they provide a] secure foundation for the people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, which generated gross violations of human rights,

*the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge.*²⁵

The demands of reconciliation with a view to ensuring a peaceful transition to a democratic society often necessitate postponing or rationing justice for the victims and families of gross human rights violations. In place of conventional justice involving legally-sanctioned punishment for crimes committed, efforts are made to expose the egregious acts and systematic violations of the past, to establish accurate and detailed records. Debate over the efficacy of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions often revolve around the requirements of expediency and the imperatives of justice and law. Nevertheless, truth and reconciliation commissions do perform a vital reconstitutive function within transitional democracies, and help to break the cycle of violence. It is extremely painful for all concerned, but when the truth is really told, it can help to bring about a transformation so substantial that deep reconciliation is far more likely to be achieved.

In concluding this section on intervention for psychological security, we would emphasise that it is the most frequently neglected, perhaps because it is considered ‘soft’, yet the power of change in the human heart is formidable. It is what can transform violent activists into statesmen. The development undergone by Nelson Mandela during his years on Robben Island, after he was convicted of terrorism, made it possible for him to emerge from jail unshakably committed to negotiation and reconciliation. Had it not been for the depth of his and his colleagues’ conviction, there were enough people on both sides ready to fight that South Africa would have been plunged into a civil war which could have taken millions of lives. The same is true of Alistair Little, who joined a Protestant paramilitary organisation in N. Ireland aged seventeen, shot a man point blank and spent the next twelve years in the Maze prison; it was there that he witnessed the fatal hunger strike of Bobby Sands. It moved him to the core that a Catholic could care so passionately about his cause as he did, and kill himself in the process. The depth of this experience was such that since his release thirteen years ago Alistair has worked full-time and often unpaid for reconciliation and bridge-building between Catholic and Protestant communities in N. Ireland.

Transforming the cycle of violence



These brief examples, taken from thousands of interventions around the globe, indicate the potency of non-violence. If applied systematically, robustly and with adequate funding, they illustrate how the cycle of violence can be transformed.

There are two points to be made in concluding this section on breaking the cycle of violence. The first concerns evaluation. There are now at least 51 institutes and other centres in the United Kingdom researching conflict resolution, from Sandhurst to Bradford University, and knowledge of what works and what does not is growing fast.²⁶ While increasingly efficient measures of evaluating conflict resolution initiatives are being developed, the fact remains that if they are successful, it is hard to measure what did not happen. Conflict prevention at its most effective will enable those involved to avoid bloodshed, possibly even a full-scale civil war, with all the associated destruction. A method of calculating or assessing the value of prevention, or of comparing the relative effectiveness of military and civilian intervention, has yet to emerge. This is a challenge for governments, intergovernmental agencies and NGOs alike.²⁷

The second point is that interventions such as these described above, while increasingly the subject of research, are inadequately funded. This issue will be addressed in the following section.

Option 5: Alter funding priorities to reflect relative effectiveness

Failure to prevent outbreaks of violence, war and genocide, for example in Rwanda and East Timor, has led to enormous losses of human lives, lifelong physical and mental injuries both to the victims and the perpetrators, and devastated social structures and networks. The economic costs to the countries concerned in terms of loss of social capital, the destruction of material assets and economic stagnation are of the order of tens of billions of dollars. In addition there are the costs of diplomatic crisis management, civilian and military peace operations, refugees and destruction. The annual costs to the international community of military and civilian measures in former Yugoslavia alone are estimated at not less than \$7bn. The cost to the international community of managing the peace is considerably lower than carrying the cost of war and violence.²⁸

The cost effectiveness of the conflict resolution measures described in the previous section is in little doubt relative to the cost of military interventions. By its very nature military intervention is enormously expensive; the bombing of Serbia in 1999 for example cost approximately \$4bn, in addition to the \$20-30bn subsequently needed to rebuild what was destroyed. By contrast, the most expensive of the measures described above is UN peacekeeping, which now incurs an annual cost of approximately \$2.8bn for operations in many different parts of the globe.²⁹ Costs of some of the community-level interventions described are as follows:³⁰

Peace Brigades International protection work in Columbia	\$0.7m
Witness Organisation annual budget	\$0.4m

Gun collection scheme in El Salvador	\$1.3m
Community of Saint Egidio mediation in Mozambique	\$0.4m
Search for Common Ground annual budget for work worldwide	\$7.0m
Centre for Peace and Non-Violence in Croatia	\$0.4m
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Sierra Leone	\$8.5m

Naturally there are many interventions which are not completed, not properly costed, or which do not achieve their aims, but the overall picture is of a very high level of motivation requiring small amounts of funding to produce results. At the same time we are aware of many community-level interventions which were unable to proceed because they could not obtain funding.³¹

Funding availability for conflict prevention and conflict resolution

There are two difficulties in obtaining information on government and intergovernmental expenditure on conflict prevention and conflict resolution. Firstly, activities which could be categorised under a conflict prevention or resolution budget line, can often be categorised under different budget lines. A wide range of initiatives can perform conflict prevention/resolution functions, including: economic assistance, democracy building, arms control, preventive diplomacy, humanitarian aid and truth and reconciliation mechanisms to name but a few. As a consequence of this obstacle, the second difficulty is a lack of disaggregated budgetary information. This problem is present in organisations such as the World Bank as well as national governments.

In the following section we have where possible included the definitions used, and made a first attempt to disaggregate funding allocations.

The United Kingdom

In the 2000 Spending Review the UK government developed, and has since implemented, a new strategy intended


*[to] improve effectiveness of the UK contribution to conflict prevention and management as demonstrated by a reduction in the number of people whose lives are affected by violent conflict and a reduction in potential sources of future conflict, where the UK can make a significant difference.*³²

To facilitate delivery of this target, the conflict prevention and management budget has been organised into two 'pools':

- 1) the Global Pool, chaired by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (FCO), to which £60m, £68m and £78m has been allocated for the years 2001/2, 2002/3 and 2003/4 respectively;
- 2) the Africa Pool, chaired by the Secretary of State for International Development (DfID), to which £50m per annum for the next three years has been allocated.

The FCO is accountable for the Global Pool. The strategies for this pool have been agreed by ministers, and have been divided into eight priority areas, four geographical (Balkans; Middle and Near East; Russia & the Former Soviet Union; and Central & Eastern Europe), and four functional (UN peacekeeping and peace-building; EU civilian crisis management; Organisation

for Security and Co-operation in Europe; and small arms). An FCO Policy Paper, Conflict Prevention, identifies discrimination, denial of rights, poverty and unaccountable security forces as the root causes of conflict today, and outlines the FCO approach to conflict in the following terms.



Selected UK budgets FY 2002
 Source: UK HM-Treasury Spending Review 2002,
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pending_Review/spend_sr02/report/

*Preventing conflict is more cost-effective than responding to a situation after the event, when it has reached crisis proportions. This is true in the cost in human lives and rebuilding devastated countries when war ends.*³³

In addition to the expenditure for the two pools referred to above, the UK government has committed funds to peacekeeping and enforcement. This budget line differs from the above figures because unforeseen circumstances can create the need for increased spending on peacekeeping, within a given financial year. The overall peacekeeping and enforcement budget is currently set at £405m, £440m and £405m for the years 2001/2, 2002/3 and 2003/4 respectively.³⁴

The UK government deserves praise as being one of the few countries which do publish expenditure on conflict prevention and management and for having made these functions the joint responsibility of the relevant departments (DfID, FCO and MoD). On 18 July 2002 the New Chapter of the Ministry of Defence Strategic Defence Review was published. In section 2.2 reference is made to conflict prevention and management.

*Countering terrorism is usually a long term business requiring the roots and causes to be addressed as well as the symptoms.*³⁵

In section 30:


We can try to prevent the conditions that allow international terrorist organisations to operate, we can help less capable states build better capabilities to counter terrorism themselves through our conflict prevention and Defence Diplomacy activities.

The budgetary information referred to by MoD in relation to conflict prevention and management is the same as above. It appears that no extra resources are allocated; conflict prevention/management has a ring-fenced cross-departmental budget.

The bar chart on the left represents expenditure on conflict prevention and management, relative to total departmental budgets for the MOD, FCO and DfID.

The United States

In 2003, conflict management and mitigation will for the first time get a separate government office, the Office for Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), under the authority of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) within the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The requested budget for FY2003 is \$10m (£6.5m). The explanation given for this development makes specific reference to 11 September.



Selected US budgets FY 2002

Source: US Budget Statement 2003
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb>

As the terrible tragedy of September 11, 2001, and its aftermath have made clear, violent conflict in a poor, distant country such as Afghanistan can spawn international terrorism that threatens world peace and security... the Agency [USAID] has decided to make addressing the problem of violent conflict in developing countries one of its main objectives.³⁶

The broader USAID conflict prevention effort crosses a number of bureaus and totals \$50.6m.³⁷ This is just below 0.6 percent of the total requested USAID budget for FY2003 of \$8.5bn (£5.5bn). As a proportion of the US GDP, the USAID budget stands at less than 0.1 percent. The basis for justifying USAID budgets is as follows:

...the modest and well-targeted investments the US government makes today in the form of human capital and partnerships with overseas communities will pay economic and political dividends to the United States well into the future.³⁸

The influence which the estimated dividends from 'potential markets' has upon the selection of countries and design of programmes should not be underestimated when analysing USAID expenditure:

USAID programs are targeted principally at developing and transition nations, which represent the world's last great underdeveloped markets.³⁹

Post 11 September, there is an opportunity for the United States to demonstrate through its AID programmes a new response-ability to local populations and needs, rather than interest-based agendas.

If we take \$50.6m dollars to be a conservative estimate for US expenditure on conflict mitigation and management (excluding peacekeeping), we have a figure with which to compare expenditures in different areas.⁴⁰ For FY2001, the United States spent \$38bn on weapons research alone. The projected expenditure for FY2002 currently stands at \$44bn.

Of the approximately \$1.9 trillion the federal Government will spend in FY2002, about one-third will be discretionary (spending which the administration must request and Congress must act on each year), the rest of the spending is mandatory, expenditure which can only be altered through a change in the law. In the FY2002, Pentagon spending now accounts for over half of all discretionary spending: Military, \$343bn; Housing Assistance, \$30bn; Social Security and Medicare, \$7bn.

It is possible to identify other sources of conflict management and mitigation expenditure from within the USAID budget, so the actual USAID expenditure on conflict management and mitigation is potentially slightly greater than \$50.6m referred to above.⁴¹ At maximum the figure would be \$60m, less than 0.02 percent of the defence budget at \$335bn.

Sweden

The Swedish are one of the few governments, along with the United Kingdom and Canada, to have developed and published working definitions of conflict management and conflict prevention.

Conflict Management... is a generic term for aid-financed interventions implemented during ongoing armed conflicts, partly for the victims of the conflict, and partly for peace building projects which have the aim of contributing to the solution of ongoing conflicts and creating the requisite conditions for long-term development and long-term peace once a peace agreement has been reached.

Conflict Prevention is used to refer to:

...interventions which have the main objective of preventing outbreaks of violence, the escalation of violence or a return to violence, i.e. which cover all three phases of an armed conflict: before, during and after.

In Sweden, the main unit within the Foreign Office dealing with conflict management is the Division for Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management, which operates within the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). SIDA does not commit a fixed amount to 'conflict management and peace building', as this budget comes from a number of entities funded from SIDA's development cooperation budget. The latest figure for SIDA was 740m Swedish Kronor (£50m), dedicated to conflict management and peace building. For FY2000-01, 50 percent of SIDA's humanitarian appropriations were channelled via different UN organisations, 25 percent through international organisations, and 25 percent through Swedish NGOs.

If governmental commitment to conflict prevention and resolution was measured by the quality of reports commissioned on the issue, Sweden's commitment would be unparalleled. Nevertheless it must be said that much of the discussion in Swedish documents is set at the macro level, and would benefit from more detail and more reference to data.

SIDA's strategy, like DfID's, is based on a substantial re-evaluation of contemporary causes of conflict, and today's broader security environment, including the concept of security itself.

Changes in security policies have increased the understanding of the profound, structural security relationships between the factors which cause armed conflicts, for example poverty, democratic issues, systematic violations of human rights, access to resources, ethnicity and the roles of religions.⁴²

It is clear that SIDA has developed substantial strategies and objectives, based on extensive 'conceptually oriented' and 'contextually oriented' background work, to act as policy guidelines. From the official Swedish documents it is also clear that preventative measures, and programmes designed to facilitate conflict resolution, are considered to be preferable to violence. The reasons stated for this are political and economic; conflict resolution is cost effective.

The European Union

Conflict prevention and crisis management are at the heart of the EU's Foreign and Security Policy.⁴³

The EU does not have a specific conflict resolution budget. Officials state that it is impossible to put a figure on how much is spent, largely because it is not easy to determine which types of operations should be included under the heading of 'conflict prevention and resolution', and which should not.

The list of means at the European Union's disposal for the prevention of conflict is long: development co-operation and external assistance; trade policy instruments; humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies; diplomatic instruments and political dialogue; co-operation with international partners and NGOs; as well as the tailor-made fashion, with an appropriate mix of instruments, to the specific situations they arise.⁴⁴

In the more specific context of 'crisis management', the EU has implemented an initiative to create a civilian capacity 'to intervene fast and effectively in crisis situations in third countries' - the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM).⁴⁵ This force will be able to help alleviate crises through the provision of such services as human rights work, election monitoring, institution building, media support, police training and the provision of police equipment, and rehabilitation. Although the conflict prevention budget has not been clearly demarcated, the expenditure on the RRM has been demarcated as follows:

FY2000/1 €20m (approx £12.6m)

FY2002/3 €25m (approx £15.8m)

In terms of EU budgets, these are hardly substantial amounts. If the EU means what it says, "following the events of September 11th 2001 the need for further investment in a conflict prevention capacity is clear",⁴⁶ then action is called for on two fronts:

- clearly specified budgets for conflict prevention and conflict resolution; and
- funding in amounts commensurate with EU-stated policy.

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE is an intergovernmental organisation comprised of 55 participating states, from Albania to France to the United States. It is the largest non-military security organisation in the world, active in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. Its headquarters are in Vienna, and there are offices in Copenhagen, Geneva, The Hague, Prague and Warsaw. Its mission is as follows:

Conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building as well as the promotion of human rights and democracy are the main tasks and activity fields of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). These contribute decisively to eliminating the most important causes of conflict and to creating the basic prerequisites for peace, security and stability in Europe.⁴⁷

Regarding terrorism, the OSCE could perform an extremely valuable role. Since the break up of the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, the OSCE has transformed itself into an organisation with some 4000 people in field missions in nineteen countries of the region. These missions have helped to end civil war and manage conflict in Tajikistan, Ukraine, Macedonia, Moldova and Georgia. The OSCE also played a major role in building civil society in post-conflict Bosnia and Kosovo. Such long-term resident missions deal with specific issues at the local level, building partnerships and defusing conflicts before they erupt. They therefore have a great potential to deal with conditions which breed terrorism in Europe and Eurasia. Political and economic instability blights so much of the central Asian region, conditions that breed terrorist organisations. If the OSCE were expanded to cover areas such as Central Asia and the Caucasus, it would address many fundamental causes of terrorism.

Despite the value of the OSCE, the organisation is little known in either the United States or the United Kingdom.⁴⁸ This problem contributes to one of the fundamental challenges facing the OSCE, namely its capacity to fill the civilian vacancies, and therefore fulfil its mandate. For example, in 1998 it took over six months for the OSCE to recruit only half the number of civilian personnel necessary to set up a civilian monitoring mission in Kosovo.⁴⁹ Subsequently, the OSCE set-up its 'REACT' scheme which enables:

...personnel to be hired according to fixed categories and levels of responsibility using standard and online application forms across all 55 member states of the OSCE. Currently, over 1200 international civilian staff are seconded to the OSCE missions in 22 countries.⁵⁰

The public information officer at the OSCE reports that since the OSCE is primarily a tool for early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post conflict rehabilitation, almost all of the budget is committed to conflict resolution and prevention. The OSCE's total budget for 2000 was €207m (£130m) and for 2001 €179m (£115m).

The only comparable figure for an inter-government organisation dealing with conflict would be that of NATO, a military alliance of nineteen nation-states. NATO operates on a very different basis. Most of its resources are provided by member states on an individual contribution basis, so that its central budget would not reflect the resources allocated to the organisation. Its central budget in 2001 was approximately €850m (£540m), coordinating forces from member states with total defence budgets of approximately €500bn (£320bn).⁵¹

The World Bank

Regarding conflict, the World Bank recognises that conflict ‘adversely [affects] the Bank’s core mission of poverty reduction’. In January 2001 the Bank distributed an operational manual to its staff, in which the Bank’s three objectives in relation to conflict are spelt out.

- In countries the Bank determines are vulnerable to conflict: promote economic growth and poverty reduction, and minimise the potential causes of conflict.
- In countries in conflict: poverty reduction and asset protection, information provision, undertake conflict impact studies (from an economic perspective), prepare for opportunities.
- In transition countries: support economic and social recovery and sustainable development.⁵²
-

Conflict prevention issues are very new to the Bank, and it has not yet developed the capacity to monitor them to provide data on costs or evaluation. Under the direction of Paul Collier (Director of the Development Research Group within the World Bank), economic analyses of the causes of conflict (specifically civil war) are rapidly growing in influence both inside and outside the Bank. The recommendations arising from such an analysis are controversial.

The fundamental finding of Collier’s extensive research is that: “civil wars occur where rebel organizations are financially viable”.⁵³ The protest discourse is, he believes, utilised by the rebel movements much as image is to a business. The sense of grievance which fuels the protest discourse may or may not be based on an objective grievance. According to Collier:

*...the economic theory of conflict argues that the motivation of conflict is unimportant; what matters is whether the organization can sustain itself financially.*⁵⁴

To ensure financial viability, rebel organisations have to find a source of revenue. The necessity leads to predatory behaviour. Therefore, it is the “feasibility of predatory behaviour which determines the risk of conflict”.⁵⁵

It is not hard to imagine that governmental agencies bound by target-based measures would be drawn to the qualitative nature of Paul Collier’s increasingly influential work on the causes of conflict. This approach makes testing policies and evaluating initiatives against measures such as Public Service Agreements more feasible. However, owing to the emphasis this approach places on the financial causes of conflict, it entirely fails to address the issues which influence the ‘cycle of violence’ discussed in the previous section, and ignores budgetary requirements for reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction.

Our preliminary research for this section reveals that in official statements regarding conflict prevention and resolution, fine sentiments are rarely supported by the funds necessary to carry them out. Governments and intergovernmental organisations have not published, and are only recently beginning to carry out, research into the cost effectiveness of conflict resolution and conflict prevention. There is, however, a developing consensus that conflict resolution and conflict prevention are cost-effective relative to military interventions (see sections on the United Kingdom and Sweden above) especially when one considers the fact that military interventions frequently occur too late, and are as much characterised by confused objectives as efficient execution.

This shift of attitude is beginning to stimulate much needed research at governmental level into various aspects of conflict resolution and prevention. Aspects of conflict prevention in particular need of further research include:

- What is the most effective mix of government intervention, intergovernmental agencies, NGOs and local grassroots initiatives?
- What is the most efficient method of identifying and supporting competent grassroots initiatives?
- What factors influence the effectiveness of an initiative?
- What techniques are replicable under which conditions?
- In a given conflict situation, if the amounts spent on military intervention in a previous similar situation are allocated to a systematic, robust programme of non-military interventions, are the results more positive and long-lasting, or less?

This is an era characterised by unprecedented global networks and interdependence, as well as by asymmetrical warfare. The use of force and counter-force will not break historically embedded cycles of violence. A major policy-watershed is called for; a policy-shift which engages with the needs and fears of others before these culminate in outbreaks of war. Responsible engagement and more support for conflict resolution initiatives by people at the front line are fundamental to any serious approach to threat reduction and human security.

Conclusion

This report has examined the effectiveness of the ‘war on terrorism’ and outlined options open to western governments in dealing with the harsh challenges of political violence.

The Taliban have been removed from power in Afghanistan, but there are serious concerns over future stability, especially the slide from warlordism into more general conflict outside Kabul. After the withdrawal of al-Qaida from Afghanistan, US intelligence sources believe that its capability for further action is largely intact.

An attack on Iraq is a separate issue from the ‘war on terrorism’, and was part of the Bush administration’s policy before 11 September. It is unlikely that making an example of the Iraqi regime would discourage other states from pursuing policies unacceptable to Washington. They are more likely to take the asymmetric route, including secretive development of deterrent capabilities and the use of surrogates and paramilitaries rather than conventional forces that would be susceptible to attack. A determined effort to seek a just settlement between Israel and the Palestinians would better serve US interests in the region and limit the capabilities of the current Iraqi regime. To prevent the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), stocks of fissile materials must be put under comprehensive international safeguards, export controls tightened, and rivalry between intelligence agencies dropped in favour of cooperation.

At a more fundamental level, the cycle of violence which frequently produces terrorism must be addressed. The cycle can be broken if adequate funding is allocated to those non-violent methods of intervention which have been shown to be effective. Currently, these interventions receive considerably less than one percent of the funds available to military intervention.

This need not be the case. The examples cited in this paper are just some of the many examples of an alternative approach to security that offers so much. One year after the 11 September attacks, the audit of the results of traditional military responses shows continuing tensions, the risk of further attacks and new dangers, especially in the Middle East. It is appropriate to promote other viable responses.

It is particularly important that leadership is forthcoming, not just from civil society, but from governments in Europe and elsewhere. We need to move away from the false notion of military control with all its inherent risks. We have an opportunity to choose instead a condition of international stability based upon peace and justice, and non-violent approaches to conflict prevention and resolution.

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