Constructive Approaches for Limiting the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Proposals for Government Action

Dr. Frank Barnaby, Professor Paul Rogers and Professor Jack Mendelsohn, May 2004

The nuclear weapons world has undergone dramatic change since the end of the Cold War. After an initial surge of nuclear arms control treaties in the early 1990's, a widespread public perception developed that the role of, and threat from, nuclear weapons had significantly diminished. This perception is false.

We now find ourselves in a nuclear weapons world still bristling with over 30,000 nuclear weapons; where the nuclear-weapon states show little inclination to make substantial progress towards nuclear disarmament; where three of the world's most intractable conflicts in South Asia, the Korean peninsula and the Middle East are increasingly dominated by the spread of nuclear weapons; and where the current nuclear non-proliferation regime has demonstrably serious flaws.

The current US administration's suspicion of arms control and disarmament agreements has led to a downgrading of multilateral routes to arms control, in favour of unilateral and pre-emptive approaches. This attitude, coupled with recent international events, may have increased, rather than decreased, the motivations for nuclear proliferation and may propel non-nuclear states more rapidly towards creating a crude but usable nuclear device to function as both deterrent and bargaining chip. Further proliferation can only increase the risk that terrorists will acquire and possibly use nuclear explosives. This paper argues that the current US-led approach to non-proliferation is counter-productive, and that the best hope for nuclear non-proliferation lies in a return to, and strengthening of existing multilateral mechanisms.

Based on the advice of key international non-proliferation experts drawn together for an intensive consultation in October 2003, we identify five specific areas in which the international community, particularly the Nuclear Weapon States, could take realistic steps to reduce the risk of further nuclear proliferation. These are:

1. Strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) by a) significantly increasing the Agency's budget and b) making Additional Protocol to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Safeguards Agreements mandatory.

2. Lead efforts to ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

3. Discourage the US from developing new 'usable' nuclear weapons, particularly 'bunker busters'.

4. Lead efforts to secure a provisional entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to strengthen the current moratorium on nuclear testing and make it more difficult to break.

5. Advocate full compliance with the letter and spirit of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the NPT 2000 Review Conference '13-steps' contained within the Final Document.


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