At a time when the issue of an Afghanistan political settlement is increasingly being discussed, what is the best framework for any talks? Would a “minilateral” forum at two levels, intra-Afghan and regional, offer the best opportunity for success? What should be the Afghan “national project” for the twenty first century – is it possible to shift thinking away from a state defined by its enemy? This would require more much imagination than a simplistic “friend-enemy” approach, writes ORG consultant Giandomenico Picco.
Giandomenico Picco draws on more than 20 years’ experience working as a leading UN negotiator to propose new ways to conceptualise the Afghanistan peace process and the future of Afghanistan.
This is the first in a series of “op-ed” articles to open up the debate on key issues. These op-eds may not represent the views of all members of ORG.
A Possible Framework for Afghanistan Negotiations
It has become a truism to say that the war in Afghanistan can only be resolved through a negotiated political settlement. The fact the foreign actors in this conflict have reached the same conclusion may derive less from the existence a workable vision of a future Afghan state, than from a collective sinking feeling that current tactics are not working. The resistance of the Taliban endures, despite the fact that the US troop surge is at its peak. And attempts by the government in Kabul to "re-integrate" fighters and units are limited in scope and vision.
The Taliban, too, may not find it easy to play the long game and merely await the departure of foreign troops, as the capacity of the Afghan state slowly increases and US troops show every sign of staying. Having stated the obvious, what type of state could realistically emerge from a negotiated settlement, and which foreign powers should be involved ?
The Soviets, the Pakistani Taliban and the Western powers have all treated Afghanistan as another Westphalian state, each for different reasons undermining the original national project which kept the kingdom in one piece since 1747. Each treated Afghanistan as a centralised state in which their proxies took control of Kabul.
That national project was centred on three pillars - two internal and one external. The domestic pillar was organizational principle of “primus inter pares” - “primus” being Kabul and the Pashtu tribe and “pares” being the other regional areas under the daily rule of other tribes or sub-tribes, as managed by their elders. While the religious centre was the mosque, the “civil side” of life was run by the “hujrah,” the group of elders. This separation was at the core of Afghan life, a sort of separation of powers which formed the second pillar. The third was Afghanistan’s foreign role a buffer state between rival empires, be they Persian and Mogul, Russian and British or Soviet and American.
The Taliban project had its roots in the religious extremism, from the Deobandi roots of the madrassas, where most Taliban were taught, together with elements of Wahabism. The Taliban brought with them a Weltanschauung in which national borders lost their relevance to religious ones. Even after the Taliban took over Kabul in 1996, with Pakistani help, they did not recognize the Durand line, the British-imposed border-line with Pakistan. Last but not least, the tribal nature of the Pashtu was indeed affected by religious extremism and by the large movement of refugees, who having left their homes, had to adjust to a different life where some of their tribal points of reference were lost.
Indeed, the last three decades have brought about an even-wider change affecting not only Afghanistan. More recently it has been an area of contested influence between Pakistan and India. The anti-Indian dimension of the Taliban phenomenon, both within the borders of Afghanistan and outside, over several years, raises the question of what can be an “effective” Pakistani role on the Afghan question without an Indian contribution to the mosaic? However, the possibility that New Delhi accepts to be clustered with Islamabad and Kabul in a limited tripartite setting, to sort out the Afghan quagmire is unlikely. And it is even less likely that Pakistan would make concessions on other issues, within a bilateral context with New Delhi, in the absence of more clarity in Afghanistan. To overcome the issue of Indian participation the grouping may have to be a bit wider.
This means that the very role of Afghanistan as an entity may have to be looked at in a rather more modern way. In other words, is there a “new national project” for Afghanistan based on the new reality- internal and international?
The presence of Iran in the negotiations would be justified by the support it gave to the Shiite Tajiks/Hazaras and the anti Taliban role that Tehran played before 2001, and indeed by its continued influence as a neighbor. Equally, Indian and Iranian participation would likely encourage Pakistan to call for a Saudi presence at the table. The closeness of Riyadh and Islamabad over the last three to four decades may not have been a subject of interest to many but it has assumed a great significance both on the religious, economic and political fronts. Again here there is an anti-Indian dimension and an anti-Iranian one that Islamabad may wish to buffer against. This “minilateral approach to negotiations” on Afghanistanmay be complemented by a slightly larger table which would include the US, NATO, the EU, Russia and China.
Inside Afghanistan, “multiple identities” may be the way to go; one can be a Tajik and an Afghan - a Tajik by language, religion and culture yet with loyalty to an Afghan identity different to that of its neighbours. “Kabul as an open city” may be another result of an intra Afghan dialogue, and a new version of a state, a confederation of sorts based on features coming from the 1000 year history of that land and others the Afghans may yet devise, learning from the horrors andmistakes of the last 40 years ( the main feature of which appears to have beenthe “demonisation of the other”.)
The Taliban movement - like anybody else in the world today - may well have to be confronted with a choice dictated by these new times. Borders do not separate us from anybody - however far or close they may be. The new realities imply that the imperative to co-exist with “the other,” “the different”, “the diverse”” is a growing necessity for the societal evolution of a more and more crowded and interconnected/interdependent world; the alternative would be a failed state or
otherwise said, the end of Afghanistan as a country.
Indeed the minilateral approach would offer also the “benefit” of having more than “two sides” to an issue and thus offering more than just “zero sum solutions” to any given problem. It would seem to me that the issues involved require more imagination to be solved than a simplistic “friend- enemy” approach. Saudi Arabia and Pakistan may actually offer very much needed leadership in this regard vis a vis the Taliban groups and their supporters from outside the
region. Yet I should stress that the lack of leadership in such negotiations does contain dangers: it might show that “other national projects” in the region are also rooted in the need for an existential enemy.
Will the Afghans find leaders who would not mistake conciliation with fear, and forbearance with weakness? A “minilateral” forum at two levels: intra Afghan and regional” may offer an opportunity to change the paradigm of the political project for Afghanistan, and more. It may offer countries like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and others the chance to take on a leadership role rarely offered by history and not yet written; it may also help introduce a new dimension to the international discourse that goes beyond the “existential” need for an enemy.
Read long version of the article here.